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Abstract
The automatic detection of unreachable coverage goals and generation of tests for ”corner-case”
scenarios is crucial to make testing and simulation based veriﬁcation more eﬀective. In this paper
we address the problem of coverability analysis and test case generation in modular and component
based systems. We propose a technique that, given an uncovered branch in a component, either
establishes that the branch cannot be covered or produces a test case at the system level which
covers the branch. The technique is based on the use of counterexamples returned by model
checkers, and exploits compositionality to cope with large state spaces typical of real applications.
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1 Introduction
Code coverage metrics, such as statement coverage and branch coverage, are
largely used in testing and simulation based veriﬁcation, both for software
and hardware design, to measure the progress of the veriﬁcation eﬀort and
to identify areas of the design where further tests are needed. Code coverage
metrics report on areas of the design which were not exercised during sim-
ulation. These will also include portions of code which are unreachable. A
common objective of simulation based veriﬁcation is that of achieving 100%
justiﬁed branch coverage. The process of manually identifying the unreach-
able portions of code or producing test cases for ”corner-case” scenarios is time
consuming and error prone. The veriﬁcation process is made more eﬃcient by
automatically and reliably establishing if a coverage goal, like the coverage of
a branch in the control ﬂow, is achievable or not. This process is the subject of
coverability analysis [13]. A typical situation in which non-coverable goals can
be found occurs when the unreachability is the result of constraints imposed
on a component by the environment in which it operates.
In this paper we propose a methodology for coverability analysis and test
case generation for uncovered branches at the system level which is based on
the use of counterexamples returned by model checkers, exploiting composi-
tionality to cope with large state spaces typical of real applications.
Counterexamples are one of the most useful outcomes of formal veriﬁcation
based on model checking [3], and have been extensively used for diagnosis of
problems detected in the models of systems. Here a richer notion of coun-
terexample is used, that is, the notion of ”counterexample automaton”, which
expresses all ﬁnite linear counterexamples of a given formula on a given model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the proposed tech-
nique in general terms. Section 3 introduce the framework (formalism, logic
and tools) used in our proposal and describes by means of an example the
method. The complexity of the method is then discussed in 4.
2 The proposed methodology
2.1 The basic principle
The methodology we propose to check coverability and derive test cases from
uncovered branches of a system is based on the following principles.
• We suppose that the system can be modeled as a ﬁnite state Labelled Transi-
tion System (LTS) [12], and that the testing process is able, through proper
tools, to provide both the coverage measure and information about the un-
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covered branches.
• Starting from each uncovered branch, we build a temporal logic formula
expressing the property: ”the uncovered branch can never be reached”.
• We apply a model checker to the LTS which models the system, to check
the given temporal logic formula on the model: if this returns TRUE, the
branch cannot be covered.
• Otherwise, we ask the model checker for a counterexample, which is a path
that exercises the uncovered branch: this path contains information about
the input needed to exercise it - that is, the sought test case.
2.2 Compositionality
This apparently simple process is however complicated by the fact that real
applications have very large state spaces, and hence model checking becomes
soon unfeasible. The methodology we propose exploits compositionality to
address this problem, as follows.
• We assume that the system is composed of a chain of modules (see Fig. 1),
and that the uncovered branch we want to address can be localized in the
inner module S0. Note that this assumption is less restrictive than what can
appear at a ﬁrst sight: indeed, a system where components interact with a
more complex structure can be sliced in modules according to this assump-
tion, by grouping more components in a single module (this is why in the
following we refer to ”modules” rather than to ”components”); moreover,
this structure is typical of the client-server interaction paradigm.
• We apply the process described in sect. 2.1 to the module S0, obtaining a
path which shows which inputs the module needs to exercise the uncovered
branch. We assume that such inputs to S0 come, as outputs, by the previous
module S1.
• From this sequence of outputs of S1, we then elaborate a temporal logic
formula φ1 expressing the property: ”it is never possible to produce such
an output sequence”.
• We apply the model checker on the model of the module S1 to check the
formula φ1: again, this should return FALSE (if not, again, the sequence
of outputs of S1 is unfeasible and hence the uncovered branch in S0 is not
reachable).
• We ask the model checker for a counterexample. This counterexample is
a path of S1 which gives the output sequence that exercises the uncovered
branch in S0. This path also contains information about the input needed
to exercise it.
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• The system being structured as a chain of modules, each one producing
input for the following one and receiving the output of the previous one, we
can repeat the application of the process above to each module encountered.
The ﬁnal counterexample, produced on Sn is actually the sought test case
for the interface of the module Sn, which when given as input to Sn causes
the intermediate counterexamples to be given as input to the next modules,
which ﬁnally causes the uncovered branch in S0 to be exercised.
S0S1S2Sn-1Sn ...
Fig. 1. A chain of modules
2.3 Coping with false counterexamples
It may be the case that the single counterexample trace returned by the
method above for a given module does not correspond to any feasible path
of the previous module in the chain. This does not mean that no test case
exists to cover the uncovered branch. Actually, the model checker has pro-
duced a single counterexample trace, which has shown to be not executable
under the input sequences that can be provided by the previous module. We
need therefore not to extract a single counterexample, but all the possible
counterexample traces: actually, the number of the possible counterexample
traces may be inﬁnite. We are interested therefore to a ﬁnite representation
of the possible counterexamples, and this leads us to the notion of “coun-
terexample automaton”[8]. A counterexample automaton for a LTS A and a
formula φ is an automaton which recognizes the language of all ﬁnite linear
counterexamples of φ on A.
As a next step, from the counterexample automaton we need to extract a
formula expressing “there exists in the model no path with a sequence of ac-
tions which is recognized by the counterexample automaton”. In the following
we will also refer to this formula as “counterexample formula”.
At this point, we can pass to model check the next module for satisfaction
of this counterexample formula, in order to obtain a new counterexample
automaton and then a new counterexample formula for the next module, and
so on, repeating this process until we arrive at the borders of the system, that
is, the last module, for which any linear counterexample provides a test case
that is the desired test case. This case is to be used directly to test the whole
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module chain, and it will cover the originally uncovered branch.
2.4 The overall test case generation procedure
The overall approach can be described by the following procedure, the details
of which will be discussed in the next section by means of a running exam-
ple, and with reference to a particular modeling formalism and veriﬁcation
environment.
We assume a chain structure such as that represented in Figure 1: Gi the
set of common actions between Si and Si+1. φi is the temporal logic formula
that is checked at the i-th step. φ0 will therefore be the formula expressing:
”the uncovered branch can never be reached”. The procedure for test cases
generation is the following.
procedure testcasegen(φ0, S0)
if MC(φ0, S0) = true
then "unfeasible path"
else AC0 := AC(φ0, S0)
φ1 := FCG0(AC0)
for i := 1,n do
if MC(φi, Si) = true
then "unfeasible path"
else
ACi := AC(φi, Si)/Gi−1ACi−1
if i = n then φi+1 := FCGi(ACi)
"any path of ACi is a test case for the system"
Where the following are auxiliary operators:
• MC, which model checks a formula on a LTS, giving a boolean result
• AC, which calculates the counterexample automaton from a formula and a
LTS,
• FC, indexed on a set of communication actions, which calculates the char-
acteristic formula of a LTS, relative to the given set of actions,
• A/GB, an indexed synchronization operator used to ﬁlter out spurious coun-
terexamples.
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3 Feasibility of the approach with JACK
In the following, in order to show the feasibility of the approach, we describe
the steps of the methodology by applying it on a running example, which
has been developed adopting the editing tools and the explicit model checker
AMC included in the integrated veriﬁcation environment JACK [1] 5 . Hence,
we inherit from JACK the formalisms in which models are described (Labelled
Transition Systems) and the logic in which properties can be described, namely
ACTL (Action-based Computation Tree Logic) [7], which is an action-based
version of the branching time temporal logic CTL [3].
3.1 Labelled Transition Systems
We use the graphical notation of Labelled Transition Systems (LTSs) and
networks of LTSs inherited in JACK from Autograph [14].
An example of a LTS is reported in Figure 2. The initial state of the LTS is
represented by a double circle and labels are associated to edges representing
transitions of the LTS.
?b???
?c?c?c?c
?d???
?a?a?a?a
?b???
?c?c?c?c
?b???
?c?c?c?c
?d???
?d???
?a?a?a?a
?a?a?a?a?e?e?e?e
?e?e?e?e
Fig. 2. The graphical speciﬁcation of an example automaton (Mod0)
To express synchronous communication between two LTSs we use the
graphical notation of networks (Fig. 3). A process represented by a box
5 Detailed information about the environment are available at http://fmt.isti.cnr.it/fmt-
tools.htm
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is said to be a network and the ports at the border are its places of inter-
connection. A box is actually an abstraction of a LTS. If two networks are
drawn at the same level, they can synchronize via the actions they execute
by linking the corresponding ports. In this case the actions executed at the
linked ports are no more observable, and the silent τ action is shown when
they are executed.
Mod1 Mod0
!a!!!
!b!!!
!c!!!
!d!!!
!e!!!?ff
ff
?a
?b
?c
?d
?e
?g
?h
Fig. 3. An example network
3.2 The logic
We use in the following a subset of the ACTL logic (Action-based Computa-
tion Tree Logic) [7], which is an action-based version of the branching time
temporal logic CTL [3]. Formulae of the kind: ”the uncovered branch can
never be reached” and “there exists no path with a sequence of actions rec-
ognized by the counterexample automaton” are deﬁnable within this ACTL
subset. Limiting to formulae of these kinds allows the notion of counterexam-
ple itself and the counterexample automaton to be deﬁned in a much more
accurate and eﬀective manner.
We can observe that all the formulae that interest us are of the kind: ∼ φ,
where ∼ is the negation operator, and φ is an existential formula.
The formulae ψ we will use are hence deﬁned according the following syn-
tax:
ψ ::= ∼ φ
φ ::= φ|φ | φ ⇒ φ | EX{act} φ | EGφ | EFφ | E[φ{act}U{act}φ]
φ formulae form a subset of the positive existential fragment of ACTL,
including the propositional disjunction and implication, the EX existential
next operator (”there exists a next state reachable with an action act and
which satisﬁes φ”), the usual existential EG always, EF eventually and EU
action-indexed until operators. We refer to [7] for the formal deﬁnition of the
previous operators.
Since we use the negation only at the beginning of a formula, counterex-
amples are actually ”witnesses” [4] of the corresponding positive formula. It
can be seen that all the formulae of kind ψ, when not satisﬁed on a LTS,
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admit linear counterexamples; correspondingly, φ formulae, when satisﬁed on
a LTS, admit linear witnesses.
3.3 A test case generation example
We show the overall test case generation procedure by means of a simple
example, a system composed by two modules, as represented by the network
in Figure 3. The modules Mod0 and Mod1 are deﬁned respectively by the LTSs
in Figures 2 and 4.
?h???
!a!a!a!a
!b!!!
!d!!!
!c!c!c!c
!d!!!
!e!e!e!e
!a!a!a!a
!b!!!
!b!!!
!c!c!c!c ?f
f? f?f?
?ff? f?f?
?g???
Fig. 4. The graphical speciﬁcation of the module Mod1
We assume that a testing activity has not covered the branch labelled by
the action ?e, (after ?a and ?b) in Mod0.
We modify the LTS of Mod0 by adding a transition just after the uncovered
branch, labelled with the fresh action !k (Figure 5, left)
The property: ”the action k is never possible” is represented by the for-
mula: ∼ EFEX{!k}true
Applying the model checker AMC to verify this formula on Mod0 we ob-
tain, as expected, a negative answer. We then generate the witness automaton
for the formula EFEX{!k}true . A witness automaton for a LTS A and a
formula phi is an automaton which recognizes the language of all ﬁnite linear
witnesses of phi on A. The algorithm that extracts the witness automaton
from the labelling of the states produced by the model checker, works on the
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Fig. 5. Marking uncovered branch in Mod0. − Counterexample automaton AC0
labelling computed by an explicit model checker during the successful check
of φ, and proceeds by visiting the portion of the state space of A which is
labelled by sub-formulae of φ; the visit is driven by the structural analysis of
the formula itself, hence it is terminated when the leaves of the formula are
reached (notice that for the used logic, the leaves are always the true sub-
formula). If needed, A is unfolded if a sequence of actions in φ matches with
a loop in A. The visit is implemented by a depth-ﬁrst search by recursion.
The automaton AC0 we obtain is therefore the counterexample automaton
of the formula: ∼ EFEX{!k}true and is represented in Figure 5, right.
We need now to provide a formula expressing “there exists no path with a
sequence of actions recognized by the counterexample automaton”. This can
be achieved by giving the characteristic formula of the automaton [2,15], that
is, a formula which describes completely the automaton itself. Actually, we
need only the existential part of the characteristic formula, and we adopt the
method shown in [9] to give an ACTL characteristic formula, exploiting the
notion of implicit ﬁxed point, which requires no explicit ﬁxed point operators.
Back to our running example, from the automaton AC0 we derive the
formula FCG, with G = (a, b, c, d, e):
<<!a>><<!b>>((<<!e>>true) |
(EG ( EX{!c} true => (EX{!c}<<!d>><<!e|!c>>true))))
where << act >> is used as a shorthand for: E[true{∼!act1& ∼!act2& . . .& ∼
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!actn}U{act}φ]
In the second step we apply then the model checker to the Mod1 LTS and
to the formula:
~<<!a>><<!b>>((<<!e>>true) |
(EG ( EX{!c} true => (EX{!c}<<!d>><<!e|!c>>true))))
and we then obtain the counterexample automaton AC1 (Figure 6).
F?g??? !a!a!a!a
!b!!!
!d!!! !e!e!e!e
?ff? f?f?
!b!!! !c!c!c!c
Fig. 6. The counterexample automaton AC1
The counterexample automaton AC1 shows a loop with !b and ?f actions,
which would correspond to a cycle of ?b on Mod0, which is not feasible; only
a single ?b action is indeed performed by Mod0 at that point. This means
that AC1 generates false counterexamples which should be avoided.
This phenomenon is due to the fact that, within ACTL, it is not possible
to predicate a complex formula on a path without using state formulae, each
of which should be individually quantiﬁed. Hence it is not possible to express
a predicate of the type ”there exists a path having a complex behaviour” but
only ”there exists a path, which, after a simple behaviour, reaches a state
from which there exists a path....”. This means that when computing the
characteristic formula we introduce spurious traces.
In order to cut this kind of false counterexamples we should consider only
the paths of AC1 that correspond to paths of AC0. This operation is essentially
a synchronization operation between AC0 and AC1 on the common actions.
We will use for this operation the notation AC1/GAC0, where G is the set of
common actions, in our case (a,b,c,d,e).
Actually, after this operation, we still need to cut away all the terminating
branches not ending in a ﬁnal state. If this is done in the example, the
operation produces the automaton represented in Figure 7.
The obtained counterexample reduces to the path ?g; !a; !b; !c; !d; !e., from
which we extract the input sequence formed only by ?g, which is the test case
that we were looking for.
Notice that producing a single linear counterexample at the ﬁrst step,
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F?g??? !a!a!a!a !b!!! !c!c!c!c !d!!! !e!e!e!e
Fig. 7. The automaton AC1/GAC0
instead of the counterexample automaton AC0, could have produced at the
end the path: ?g; !a; !b; !c;, which is actually the shortest counterexample, but
is not feasible in the Mod1 LTS.
This process can be repeated, as long as we have modules connected in
a chain; for each intermediate module the counterexample automaton and
formula should be calculated and the latter should be checked on the next
module. For the last module the counterexample automaton, once false coun-
terexamples have been ﬁltered out, deﬁnes a set of test cases, each covering
the originally uncovered branch.
4 Complexity of the procedure
The following elements add up to the computational complexity of the proce-
dure:
• Model checking (MC) is linear with the product of state space size times
the length of the formula (that is, the maximum nesting of operators);
• The length of characteristic formula (FC) is linear in the size of the au-
tomaton. Linear as well is the complexity of the characteristic formula
generation;
• Synchronization of automata (/G) has a complexity of at most the product of
the sizes of the automata; here it is applied to two successive counterexample
automata;
• Counterexample automata (AC) tend to be small, since they generate new
test cases: if we assume that the approach is applied only when the ”eas-
iest” test cases have already been exercised and only ”corner-case” test
cases remain to be discovered, the counterexample automata is a small sub-
automaton of the considered module (not really a sub-automaton, because
some loops may be unfolded depending on the length of the formula).
• The model complexity is anyway attacked compositionally
The order of complexity is therefore n∗m∗c, where n is the number of modules
in the chain, m the (average) state space of a module, c the (average) state
space of a counterexample automaton. Note that this may be substantially
better than n ∗m ∗m, due to the generally low dimensions of the counterex-
ample automata, especially for ”corner-case” counterexamples.
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An alternative to the above procedure could be deﬁned using the explicit
synchronization of two successive modules. We claim that, of the two, the
procedure which uses the characteristic formula plus model checking has the
minimal complexity achievable based on explicit state space enumeration.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
We have detailed the proposed approach using a single running example, and
particular formalisms and veriﬁcation tools. Nevertheless, we believe that
the approach has a general validity. Work is in progress on implementations
of the approach both using explicit model checking (as shown in the paper)
and BDD-based symbolic model-checking, but still focusing on LTSs and on
action-based temporal logics.
It seems however reasonable that the approach works as well with a state
based formalism (Kripke Structures) and a state based temporal logic (such as
CTL). This needs to be veriﬁed: the very deﬁnition of counterexample, witness
and counterexample automaton is actually highly sensitive to the logic used
and to the assumptions on the models.
A result which is related to our work is the deﬁnition of more expressive
tree-like counterexamples for Kripke Structures and CTL; such counterexam-
ples are used as a support to guide a reﬁnement technique [5]. The main
diﬀerence with respect to our approach is that a tree-like counterexample is in
its entirety a proof that the formula is not valid. Our counterexample automa-
ton gives instead the set of all linear counterexamples, each of which can be
taken separately as a traditional counterexample. A recent evolution of tree-
like counterexamples is represented by proof-like counterexamples [11], used
to extract proofs for the non satisﬁability of a formula over a model. Closer
to our approach is the multiple counterexamples generation of [6,10], which
generates all the counterexamples to a given length, expressed as a single
counterexample trace annotated with possible values of binary variables.
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